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Abstract
In this thesis, I examine a protocol that is designed to provide reliable IP multicast. I
evaluate the efficiency and reliability of the protocol in a friendly environment and in
the face of several different types of malicious attacks. These attacks include general
attacks on the network, which hamper any type of communication, as well as attacks
aimed at specific weaknesses of the protocol. The protocol was evaluated to see how
reliability and efficiency degrade in the face of such attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Multicast is an extension to the regular protocol for sending messages between host
nodes on the internet. Multicast describes the sending of messages from one node
to a group of nodes. The sender may or may not know all of the recipients of the
messages. Although mechanisms for reliably sending messages to one node or to a very
small number of nodes are robust and well understood, mechanisms for multicasting
messages are much newer and there are no commonly accepted standards for reliable
multicast.
In this thesis, I will discuss several protocols which have been proposed and imple-
mented to attempt to provide reliable multicast communications. I will also present
attacks designed to interfere with these protocols. Then I will show measurements of
the performance of these protocols, both with and without attacks and analyze the
reliability of these protocols.
1.1 Motivations for developing reliable multicast
The effects of multicasting messages can be achieved by simply sending separate
messages to each node in the group. This requires the sending node to send out a
distinct message for each node that it's trying to send to. However, this often uses
much more network bandwidth than is necessary, especially if many of the recipients
of the message are on the same subnet. The traffic generated by this is shown in
Figure 1-1: Network traffic with unicast communications.
figure 1-1.
This also requires the sending node to know in advance all of the nodes to which
it is sending. For these reasons, protocols have been designed specifically for multi-
casting messages.
1.2 Unicast Communications
Reliable point to point communication over the internet is usually accomplished
through the use of two standard protocols. The IP, or Internet Protocol[3], spec-
ifies how communication packets are routed. The TCP, or Transmission Control
Protocol[4], ensures reliable delivery of packets.
The Internet Protocol specifies an addressing scheme for computers and a mecha-
nism for fragmenting message packets that are too large to be sent over the network.
It also defines a standard format for packet headers. It does nothing to ensure the
delivery of packets.
The Transmission Control Protocol specifies a sequence of packets to be ex-
changed, via the Internet Protocol, between the sender and the receiver of the data.
The TCP ensures that the receiver has received the data and the sender knows that
the receiver has the data. This protocol will work, even if a significant fraction of the
packets that are sent never arrive at their destination.
The Transmission Control Protocol also provides for flow control. The sender of
the data gets feedback about how many of the packets it sends are never reaching their
destination. Assuming that packet loss is due to network congestion, the sender can
adjust the rate at which it sends packets to make full use of the available bandwidth
while avoiding network congestion.
1.3 IP Multicast
Figure 1-2: Network traffic with multicast communications.
The Internet Protocol has been extended to allow multicasting[1]. The extension
specifies multicast group addresses. Hosts can subscribe to multicast groups, and
senders can send to a group address rather than to an individual node. When a
router receives a message addressed to a multicast group, it forwards it to a subnet if
and only if it knows of any nodes on the subnet subscribed to that group. This saves
a lot of traffic, as shown in figure 1-2.
This protocol greatly reduces the communication complexity of sending a single
message to multiple hosts. Under the original protocol, the number of packets sent
would have had to equal the number of hosts receiving the message. The multicast
extension guarantees that for each message packet sent to a multicast group, only one
copy of the packet traverses each link of the network.
1.3.1 Difficulties in Achieving Reliability
The Internet Protocol extension does the same for multicast as the original IP did
for unicast. However, there is no equivalent to TCP for multicast. Several protocols
have been proposed and developed, but none is accepted as a standard for reliable
multicast.
Figure 1-3: Acknowledgement implosion.
The method used in TCP would be impractical to transfer to multicast. In TCP,
the receiver of the data sends an acknowledgement to the sender upon receipt of the
data, and the sender resends the data if it fails to receive an acknowledgement. If
every subscriber to a multicast group were to send an acknowledgement packet to the
sender, the efficiency benefits gained by the multicast protocol would be completely
undone. This is called the ACK implosion problem, and is shown in figure 1-3.
Also, the sender would need to know every subscriber to the multicast group,
or else it would have no way of knowing if all of the subscribers had sent acknowl-
edgements. A way is needed to ensure delivery to all receivers without drastically
increasing network traffic.
Chapter 2
Existing Reliable Multicast
Protocols
There are several general strategies that have been proposed for ensuring reliable
delivery of multicast messages. However, there is no protocol which is widely used
and accepted as standard.
For this project, I am only going to look at one reliable multicast protocol. This
protocols was chosen because source code for it was available, making modifications
possible, and because it is sufficiently developed to be in a marketable form. This
protocol is the Reliable Multicast Protocol, or RMP[5].
2.1 Classes of protocols
The existing reliable multicast protocols can be divided into three basic types. There
are ring based protocols, tree based protocols and cloud based protocols[2].
Ring based protocols typically assign all of the multicast group members a place
in a virtual ring. A token is held by one member of the ring and passed periodically.
Typically the passing of the token is used to ensure delivery of all messages. When a
host receives the token, it is guaranteed that every host has received all of the data
sent before the last time the host received the token.
Tree based protocols divide the multicast group into a virtual tree. Each tree
node is responsible for making sure that all of its descendents have received all of the
messages.
Cloud based protocols do not have any structure for assuring that all messages
are delivered. Any node that does not receive a message simply requests the retrans-
mission of that message until it receives it. This sort of negative acknowledgement
system is generally less reliable but more efficient than a positive acknowledgement
system.
2.2 RMP
The Reliable Multicast Protocol is a ring based protocol. There is a token which
is passed around the ring. When a message is sent, the token holder sends an ac-
knowledgement message to the sender. The acknowledgement includes the sequence
number of the original message. The sender continues to resend each message until
it receives an acknowledgement for that message from the token holder. Other nodes
look for gaps in the sequence numbers of the messages they have received. Gaps
indicate missing messages. If another node realizes it has not received a message, it
requests a retransmission of the message.
Reliability is ensured through the passing of the token. Before the token holder
passes the token to the next member in the group, it makes sure that that member
has received every message up to that point. If the token is passed often enough,
every group member is kept reasonably up to date.
Occasionally, network failures make the delivery of some messages impossible for a
period of time. If some members of the group are unreachable for too long, the group
dissolves and attempts to reform itself so that it contains only the members of the
group that are actually reachable through the network. Processes in the group initi-
ate successive reformations until one succeeds. A reformation is considered to have
succeeded when all of the reachable group members agree upon the new membership
list of the group.
The Reliable Multicast Protocol is reliable and reasonably efficient. However,
because of the ring configuration, scalability is limited. It also imposes the restriction,
which is not present in IP multicast, that all the members of a multicast group are
known at all times.
Chapter 3
Attacks
The intent of this project is to examine the chosen multicast protocol for performance.
Two aspects of performance are efficiency and robustness. Multicasting a message
to a large number of nodes should be considerably faster and require many fewer
messages to be sent than sending the identical message to each node individually
would be. The data that each receiver gets should be the same as what the sender
sent. The sender should know if the receivers do not get all of the data for any reason.
The performance of a protocol can be measured on an unloaded network in optimal
conditions. However, this will not give a very accurate impression of its performance
in other types of conditions. To be useful practically, a protocol must be able to
operate effectively over heavily loaded networks, unreliable network connections or
environments which may include misconfigured or malicious hosts.
The purpose of evaluating the performance of protocols in the face of malicious
attacks is to see how the protocols perform over a wide range of conditions, rather
than just optimal conditions.
Some attacks affect performance. They may cause packets to be lost or delayed in
transmission. The performance of a protocol in the face of such an attack should be
similar to the performance of the protocol on a slow or lossy network. If a significant
percentage of the traffic is still getting through, the protocol should still operate
correctly. However, the rate at which the protocol degrades in performance under
such an attack is an indication of how well the protocol is designed.
Other attacks involve transmitting packets specifically intended to disrupt the
workings of the protocol. With the technology I am using in this thesis, which does
not include encryption and verification of senders, it is impossible to guarantee that
a protocol will behave correctly in the face of any attack. However, a well defined
protocol should be able to still function in the face of some simple attacks.
3.1 Flooding Attacks
Flooding attacks are a very simple class of attacks which do not target any particular
protocol. These attacks simply send extraneous packets at a very great rate to the
multicast address that the protocol is using. The packets can contain anything, since
the value of the attack lies in the volume of packets sent, not the contents of the
packets.
The resulting network traffic can cause many packets to be delayed or to be lost
completely due to network congestion. Some slowdown in the rate at which data is
transfered is expected in the face of this attack.
A simple version of this attack was implemented for this thesis. The rate at which
flood packets are sent in this attack is dependent only on the speed of the machine on
which the attack is being run. The data that was sent in the packets was generated
by simply allocating a memory buffer and sending its uninitialized contents.
3.2 Replay Attacks
Replay attacks are another general class of attacks. They involve listening to traffic
on a network and sending exact duplicates of some or all of the packets sent over that
network.
This sort of attack can also be used against protocols which employ encryption.
Although the attacker cannot decrypt the packets, it can replay encrypted packets
which the receivers can decrypt. Authentication techniques can provide protection
against this attack at the cost of additional overhead in sending and receiving.
The implementation of this attack used for this thesis was a simple program
which listened to the IP multicast address that the reliable multicast protocol used
and replayed all packets sent to that address, except ones from the attacking node.
3.3 Dropped Packet Attacks
Dropped packet attacks are a very simple type of insider attacks. This type of attack
requires the attacker to be able to pose as one of the receivers within the multicast
protocol.
In the RMP protocol, each receiver must explicitly join the group of receivers.
Each receiver must request permission to join, but in the implementation that was
used for this thesis, there is no provision for excluding a receiver. If the membership
of the group is limited in a secure way, this attack might become infeasible.
In this type of attack, the attacker intentionally drops some or all of the data
packets received. This causes the attacker to request retransmissions of the dropped
data, which increases the network traffic and delays the sending of new data packets.
This attack is also similar to the case where a sender is multicasting to a group
of receivers, one of whom is on the other end of a slow, congested network link. In
either case, one of the receivers is not getting all of the packets and must request
retransmissions. The difference between this case and the implementation of the
dropped packet attack that was used is that the attacking host only dropped data
packets, whereas a host on a unreliable network would lose all types of packets with
equal probability.
The algorithm used to determine which packets to drop involved two states. The
network could either be "down", in which case packets were dropped, or "up". After
each packet arrives, the network may or may not change states according to the packet
loss parameter. The state diagram used to determine the network state is shown in
figure /refdrop:figl.
The algorithm I used had a scaling factor of one half. This means that if packets
are dropped with overal probability P and the network is currently up, the probability
~.5P
Figure 3-1: Simple state diagram for dropped packets.
of the network going down is one half of P.
3.4 RMP Token Attack
Ring based protocols such as RMP depend on a token being passed in order to
guarantee delivery to all of the receiving hosts. Therefore, a type of attack which is
specific to ring based protocols is an attack on the token.
This type of attack does not prevent the sender from sending data or the receivers
from receiving it. However, it removes the guarantee that all of the receivers have
received all of the data. This sort of attack would probably be most effective in
conjunction with another attack which prevents receivers from receiving data.
In one type of token attack, one receiver takes the token when it is passed to them.
However, the receiver keeps the token, rather than passing it on. Like the dropped
packet attack, this is another insider attack.
Chapter 4
Testing Procedure
All of the attacks described in chapter 3 were tested against an implementation of the
RMP protocol. The implementation used was version 1.3 Beta of the implementation
written by Todd Montgomer, Brian Whetten and John R. Callahan and available at
ftp://research.ivv.nasa.gov/pub/src/RMP/.
An isolated network setup was used, to insure that outside traffic did not interfere
with the measurements. This made the results obtained less representative of general
use conditions. However, it decreased the variation in the network due to outside
factors, making the results obtained more accurate and repeatable.
4.1 Network
The network used consisted of four computers connected via a single ethernet hub
as shown in figure 4-1. All four computers used were running Solaris version 2.5.1.
However, MASON and NOMAD have Sun Sparc processors and LEWIS and CLARK
have Intel based x86 processors.
A simple file transfer program was used which took a file as input, joined the
specified RMP group and sent the data in the file to the group via the RMP protocol.
As soon as it had received confirmation that all of the group members had received
the data, the program exited. The sending program did not know the identity of the
intended receivers. It simply sent to all of the members of the RMP group at the
NOMAD
Figure 4-1: Test network configuration.
CLARK LEWIS
MASON
time it joined the group.
The receiver program that was used joined the specified RMP group at startup.
It recorded everything sent to the RMP group while it was a member and printed it
to a file. The receiver programs were all run before the sending program so that the
sending program would see the correct group membership when it started.
In order to simulate a larger network and a larger group of receivers, multiple
receive programs were run on each host. For the measurements done in this thesis,
one host would run a send program and a receiver. The other hosts would run two
receivers apiece. The attacking program was run on one of the machines with two
receivers.
4.2 Gathering Data
Measurements on network traffic were collected using the snoop program. One of the
hosts running two receiver programs also snooped all of the traffic on the network
and recorded it for later analysis.
Snoop was chosen to gather data because it does not require statistics to be
collected by the RMP protocol. Having the protocol keep statistics might have altered
the results. The disadvantage of using snoop is that there is the possibility that snoop
might not get all of the packets. To reduce this risk, MASON, which is the fastest of
the four machines used, was used to collect the data.
The RMP send and receive programs were first run with no attacks against them
and their performance was measured. This was done to provide a baseline with which
to compare all subsequent test results.
The same send and receive programs were then run again with the flood attack,
the replay attack and the dropped packet attack. The dropped packet attack was
performed with 4 different levels of packet loss, as well as the baseline 0 percent loss.
The levels measured were 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent and 95 percent packet
loss on a single receiver.
For the purpose of all of the measurements described, a single 908 kilobyte data
file was multicast to the seven receivers in each test. The base configuration and each
attack configuration was run ten times in order to find a range of possible performance
responses as well as the average response.
The token attack was not tested. When this was implemented with the version of
RMP used, the protocol detected the failure of the token pass. The response of RMP
to a failure detection is to force a reformation of the group. However, in the version
of RMP that was used for these experiments, the reformation function hasn't been
implemented yet, so the process simply exited with an error. Therefore, no useful
data could be gathered.
Chapter 5
Test Results
5.1 Measurements
The RMP file transfer program was run ten times with no attacks and ten times with
each attack. A 908 kilobyte file was sent in each trial. The trace recorded from each
trial was used to calculate a number of things, including the total time from when the
sender first attempted to join the group until it left the group, the time actually spent
transferring the data, the total number of data sent, both in terms of IP datagrams
sent and in the total number of data packets sent. A single datagram could consist of
multiple data packets if the datagram had to be broken down into a size that could
be transmitted over the network.
In the cases where the file transfer did not complete succesfully, I measured the
amount of data sent successfully to each receiver. I also verified whether the data
that was received was correct and uncorrupted.
5.1.1 Base Case
First I ran file transfer program and took measurements with no attack running. This
provided a base case with which to compare the performance of the protocol in the
face of attacks.
In the trials run with no attacks, all of the data was successfully transmitted to
all of the receivers. The average amount of time for the data to be sent once the
sender had joined the RMP group was 46.76 seconds. The average time it took the
sender to send data, including the time from when it first attempted to join the group
until it left was 82.44 seconds. More detailed numbers on all of the tests are given in
appendix A.
5.1.2 Flooding Attack
For the flooding attack, the attacking machine flooded the network with garbage
packets as fast as possible.
When a host joins an RMP group, it sends out a join message to the group address
and waits for a response back. If it doesn't receive a response back within a certain
period of time, it forms its own group.
The flooding attack caused many packets that hosts tried to send on the test
network to be delayed or to not be sent. As a result, sometimes a host attempting
to join an already existing RMP group would decide that the group didn't exist and
form its own group with the same name and address.
When this occurred, there would be two or more distinct sets of hosts claiming to
be the same group. Any hosts attempting to join the same RMP group subsequently
would either end up joining one of the two groups or forming their own.
When this occured, the sender would join one of the groups, and only the receivers
actually in that group would receive any data.
In six of the trials, all of the receivers got the data. However, in one trial the
sender only sent to 4 hosts and in another trial it only sent to 2 hosts. In one trial
the sender formed a group by itself and didn't send to any of the receivers.
In all of the these cases, all of the data was correctly transmitted to all of the
receivers who got any data. The other receivers got no data and in some cases detected
an error and exited. The sending program believed it had successfully transmitted
the data to all of the receivers in the RMP group. However, the receivers it believed
to be in the RMP group included only those receivers who actually got the data.
In one trial a failure was detected and the program exited before sending all of
the data. In this case, two of the receivers got 522.5 kilobytes of data before the error
was detected. The rest of the receivers didn't receive any data.
In the trials where all of the receivers received all of the data, it took an average
of 53.4 seconds to transfer the data, with a standard deviation of 6.9. The average
time for the sender to join the group, send the data and leave the group was 80.9
seconds with a standard deviation of 12.
These times represent a slightly longer time to send data than the base case.
However, this is not reflected in a correspondingly longer connect time.
In the trials where data was sent to only a subset of the receivers, the sending
times were shorter.
5.1.3 Replay Attack
For this attack, a program on the host MASON listened to the multicast address and
port being used for the multicast file transfer program. Whenever a packet that didn't
come from the attacking program was sent to that address, the attacking program
sent a packet with the exact same contents to the same address.
In nine of the ten trials, the sending program joined the group, sent the file and
exited without detecting any error. In one of the trials the sender detected an error
and exited after only 106 kilobytes had been sent.
In the nine trials that completed, the two receiving programs running on the
machine MASON and the receiver running on the machine NOMAD received all of
the data successfully. In one of the nine trials, the receivers running on the machine
LEWIS received all of the data successfully.
In eight of the trials, the receivers on LEWIS received the same quantity of data
as was sent. However, there were errors in the data received. Most of the file was the
same as the file sent. However, some bytes differed. In the nine trials that completed,
the same behavior was seen by the receivers on the machine CLARK.
The data received was not corrupted in the same way in different trials. Nor did
different receivers necessarily have the same corrupted data on the same trial.
In the trials where the send completed, it took an average of 55.2 seconds to
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Figure 5-1: Packet drop rate vs. Number of Trials Which Failed to Complete
transfer the data, with a standard deviation of 6.1. The average time for the sender
to join the group, send the data and leave the group was 83.6 seconds with a standard
deviation of 13.9.
These times represent an increase in sending time over the base case. They are
also slightly higher than the times obtained from the flood attack.
5.1.4 Dropped Packet Attack
I ran the dropped packet attack with packet drop rates from 25 percent to 95 percent.
The results from these tests were compared against the baseline results.
As the the percentage of dropped packets increases, so does the likeihood that the
send will fail to complete due to an error. This relationship is shown in figure 5-1.
The baseline results had a 0 percent failure rate, whereas none of the trials at the
95 percent packet drop rate completed successfully. Failures occurred when a group
member perceived an error.
In this test, the apparent high packet loss rate to the attacking host made it
appear as if the network was temporarily unreachable. The response that should
result from detection of an error of that sort is to force a reformation. However, since
the reformation code hadn't been implemented in the version of RMP used for these
experiments, the host detecting the problem exited with an error instead.
In addition to happening more frequently, failure occurred sooner as the per-
centage of dropped packets increased. The relationship between the rate of packets
dropped and the amount of data sent before a failure is detected is shown in figure 5-2.
If a failure did not occur at any time during a trial, the amount of data successfully
sent was 908 kilobytes.
In the trials where no error was detected and the send completed successfully, the
amount of time required to send the data varied. As the rate of dropped packets
increased, more retransmissions became necessary, slowing down the rate at which
new data was sent.
The relationship between the percentage of packets dropped and the amount of
time it took the sender to join the RMP group, send the data and leave the group is
shown in figure 5-3.
The relationship between the percentage of packets dropped and the amount of
time it took the sender to send the data, once the sender was already in the group,
is shown in figure 5-4.
5.2 Interpretation
All of the attacks appeared to increase the time to send data by some amount. In
addition, most of them caused other problems to appear as well.
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5.2.1 Failures
Since the version of RMP that was used does not have reformations implemented, it
is hard to guage how much failures detected in transmission would affect the transfer
if reformations were an option in the face of failures.
It is probable that most if not all of the failures which caused the termination
of the data transfer would have only caused a reformation to begin if that were
implemented. In this case, if a successful reformation occurred such failures would
cause a significant increase in transmission time, but not necessarily a fatal error.
As long as some data is successfully sent before a reformation occurs, progress
is made. If the RMP group is always able to reform itself then the transfer will
eventually complete. In all of the attacks that were implemented and tested, some
data was sent at least some of the time before a failure occurred. Therefore, these
attacks would delay transmission of data but not prevent it indefinitely if the group
always successfully reformed itself.
There is the possibility that the group might fail to reform itself or that it might
not include all of the original group members in the reformed group. If this were to
happen, some or all of the receivers might not get the data. It is unknown what affect
these attacks would have on the reformation process.
5.2.2 Incorrect Data
A more serious consequence of these attacks was incorrect data being received by
some of the receivers without any of the group members detecting an error.
Both of the receivers who got incorrect data had Intel type processors running
Solaris. It is unclear why only these two machines were affected. However, the
problem appears to be spacific to that type of machine. If this is the case, it might
be a problem with the specific implementation of the protocol on that platform and
not a conceptual problem with the protocol.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The results of the experiments described in this document show that the implemen-
tation of the Reliable Multicast Protocol which was used for these tests is vulnerable
to attacks.
These attacks reliably slow down the rate at which data is sent or prevent the
data from being transmitted altogether. In some circumstances these attacks can
cause intended receivers to fail to be able to join the receiving group or data that
was transmitted to be received incorrectly without either the sender or the receiver
detecting the error.
However, the vulnerability of an implementation of a particular protocol to attacks
does not necessarily imply that the protocol is vulnerable to those attacks. Such
vulnerabilities can either be the fault of the protocol or of the implementation.
It is fairly clear that most if not all of the failures to transmit the data are a result
of the particular implementation. The data corruption which was observed in the
test of the replay attack also appears to be an artifact of this implementation.
On the other hand, the slowdown in the rate that data was sent to the receivers
that was observed in response to several of the attacks is almost certainly a result of
the protocol. The slowdown rate that was observed is also quite likely artificially low,
since the rate was only calculated from the test trials which completed successfully.
However, the trials upon which the attack had the greatest impact were the most
likely to fail.
In addition to the observed slowdown, the protocol is particularly vulnerable to
attacks that are aimed at reducing the speed at which data is transmitted because of
the method the protocol uses to deal with errors.
If each of the failures observed represents a situation where a complete imple-
mentation of the protocol would initiate a reformation, then each of those failures
represents a significant increase in the total time to transfer data. The sooner the
transfer program detected an error and exited in the tests, the more times the at-
tacker would have forced a reformation if the transfer program ran to completion. If
a lot of reformations occur, this could represent a very significant slowdown.
The failure of some receivers to join the multicast group in the face of the flooding
attack is also most likely a result of the protocol and not the particular implementation
used. The protocol requires all receivers in the RMP protocol to explicitly join the
RMP group and be acknowledged by the current group members.
The reliance of the protocol on knowing the group membership at all times is
a point of failure. Any attack which prevents a receiver from communicating with
the RMP group for a sufficient length of time can cause different receivers to have
inconsistent views of the group membership.
6.1 Future Work
There are several areas where further research is called for. Experimenting with
other implementations of the same protocol would provide more insight into what
the limitations of the protocol are, and what are the limitations of this particular
implementation. Also, there are many other attacks against RMP which could be
implemented and tested.
Group reformations are processes which are particular to this protocol which would
be particularly valuable to explore further. Experimenting with implementations
which include reformations would provide many more opportunities to examine the
response of this protocol to various attacks.
In addition, the existence of reformations provide a target for a whole class of
attacks. One can envision a class of attacks which seeks to prevent a reformation from
ever successfully completing, thereby halting the transmission of data indefinitely once
a reformation is forced. Some of these threats could be countered through the use of
authentication to create a trusted group, but not all.
Appendix A
Test Results
Kbytes Sent IP Data Total Data Transfer
Successfully Datagrams Packets Time Time
1 908 280 1833 91.34 56.31
2 908 225 1497 120.55 39.04
3 908 266 1761 75.04 49.04
4 908 251 1633 83.54 48.12
5 908 246 1620 73.90 46.94
6 908 254 1711 73.08 46.17
7 908 226 1501 67.43 40.48
8 908 248 1651 76.43 50.17
9 908 263 1720 75.95 50.59
10 908 253 1664 87.13 40.76
Avg. 908 251 1659 82.44 46.76
St.Dev 0 16.9 105.72 15.18 5.38
Table A.1: RMP File Transfer Without Attacks
Kbytes Sent Successful IP Data Total Data Transfer
Successfully Receivers Datagrams Packets Time Time
1 908 7 229 1607 98.05 58.71
2 908 4 195 1388 82.54 43.89
3 908 2 238 1656 75.38 43.55
4 908 7 237 1645 85.52 55.85
5 908 7 213 1475 61.05 39.93
6 908 7 209 1464 83.80 54.22
7 908 7 234 1563 78.15 53.81
8 908 7 231 1625 78.90 57.66
9 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A
10 522.5 2 266 1822 110.03 62.49
Avg. 778.66 5 205.2 1424.5 83.71 52.23
St.Dev 299.21 2.75 74.63 515.06 13.87 7.85
Table A.2: RMP File Transfer With Flood Attack
Kbytes Sent Successful Total Data Transfer
Successfully Receivers Time Time
1 908 3 83.76 62.08
2 908 3 110.93 59.69
3 908 3 79.27 58.31
4 908 3 67.21 42.48
5 908 3 76.04 54.42
6 106 3 82.58 54.04
7 908 3 73.52 49.76
8 908 3 78.47 52.43
9 908 3 101.48 58.91
10 908 5 81.76 59.01
Avg. 827.8 3.2 83.5 55.11
St.Dev 253.61 0.63 13.09 5.83
Table A.3: RMP File Transfer With Replay Attack
Kbytes Sent IP Data Total Data Transfer
Successfully Datagrams Packets Time Time
1 908 310 2021 73.58 47.14
2 908 325 2126 89.25 59.0
3 908 354 2259 73.27 47.96
4 908 279 1840 86.79 45.82
5 604 303 2059 84.30 40.93
6 580 271 1841 121.03 38.82
7 908 325 2086 74.27 51.45
8 908 327 2132 81.95 56.81
9 0 109 755 113.73 15.7
10 0 51 354 60.24 31.83
Avg. 663.2 265.4 1747.3 85.84 43.55
St.Dev 372.63 101.54 648.36 18.69 12.72
Successful Avg. 908 320 2077.3 79.85 51.36
Successful St.Dev 0 24.64 139.95 7.14 5.44
Table A.4: RMP File Transfer With 25% Packet Drop Rate
Kbytes Sent IP Data Total Data Transfer
Successfully Datagrams Packets Time Time
1 139 123 804 83.70 15.35
2 164 323 2138 99.41 49.85
3 908 485 3129 99.58 77.49
4 204 165 1109 72.76 33.23
5 220 161 1052 88.23 61.90
6 908 490 3230 95.94 71.29
7 908 427 2692 93.36 62.74
8 908 442 2834 93.00 65.69
9 908 428 2731 103.44 63.93
10 473.5 288 1871 109.41 41.15
Avg. 574.05 333.2 2159 93.88 54.26
St.Dev 363.23 142.02 906.90 10.45 19.24
Successful Avg. 908 454.4 2923.2 97.06 68.23
Successful St.Dev 0 30.84 242.30 4.43 6.13
Table A.5: RMP File Transfer With 50% Packet Drop Rate
Kbytes Sent IP Data Total Data Transfer
Successfully Datagrams Packets Time Time
1 908 567 3611 87.01 61.28
2 180 206 1392 75.72 24.91
3 908 629 3955 91.31 61.06
4 8 120 814 58.44 13.88
5 694 555 3604 124.61 70.37
6 908 599 3791 110.24 74.02
7 908 539 3533 98.99 65.33
8 114 161 1032 85.27 31.34
9 490 414 2653 105.46 67.79
10 286 258 1726 77.79 29.10
Avg. 540.4 404.8 2611.1 91.48 49.91
St.Dev 369.16 199.04 1248.5 19.11 22.39
Successful Avg. 908 583.5 3722.5 96.89 65.42
Successful St.Dev 0 39 188.94 10.19 6.06
Table A.6: RMP File Transfer With 75% Packet Drop Rate
Kbytes Sent IP Data Total Data Transfer
Successfully Datagrams Packets Time Time
1 24.5 215 1369 78.14 18.16
2 57 151 1014 74.29 15.42
3 8 128 822 56.05 15.12
4 41 193 1269 55.10 15.94
5 24.5 125 832 50.63 12.93
6 0 126 810 45.49 10.98
7 16 160 1021 65.07 13.33
8 16 116 787 49.5 9.76
9 8 107 714 46.18 8.68
10 90 206 1357 54.91 17.68
Avg. 28.5 152.7 999.5 57.54 13.8
St.Dev 27.38 39.34 249.39 11.37 3.24
Table A.7: RMP File Transfer With 95% Packet Drop Rate
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